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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
For many individual Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) recipients, the risk of losing Medicaid coverage linked to their 
cash benefits is a powerful work disincentive. Eliminating barriers to health care and 
creating incentives to work can greatly improve financial independence and well being. 
To support this goal, Congress included a Medicaid Buy-In option in the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997 and enacted the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement 
Act (TWWIIA) in 1999. These laws authorized states to create Medicaid Buy-In 
programs to extend Medicaid coverage to persons with disabilities who go to work.  
 
This report discusses findings from case studies of nine states operating Medicaid 
Buy-In programs for working persons with disabilities. The nine states are Alaska, 
Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, Vermont, and 
Wisconsin. At the time of the study, approximately 13,000 persons were enrolled in the 
programs in the nine states. The paper gives particular attention to the decisions made 
by states concerning program eligibility, their approaches to estimating program 
enrollment and costs, and the patterns of program enrollment to date. The report is 
designed to assist stakeholders (such as Medicaid directors, state legislators, and 
cross-disability coalitions) design and implement Medicaid Buy-In programs and related 
work incentive initiatives.  
 
This report is the second in a series of three reports. The first report includes in-
depth case studies of nine early implementer states entitled Medicaid Buy-In Programs: 
Case Studies of Early Implementer States. The final report, Policy Frameworks for 
Designing Medicaid Buy-In Programs and Related State Work Incentive Initiatives, 
provides policy frameworks describing the interrelationships between health 
entitlements (especially Medicaid) and cash assistance programs (particularly SSDI, 
SSI and state SSI supplementation programs).1 
 
 
Major Findings 
 
1. Medicaid Buy-In programs typically are managed by state Medicaid 
agencies with significant input from consumers and assistance from other 
state agencies.  
 
• Stakeholder involvement was important in program design. The input of 
persons with disabilities and other stakeholders had an impact in shaping 
                                                 
1 The three reports were funded through a contract with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office 
of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation supporting a project entitled "Case Studies and Technical 
Assistance for Medicaid Buy-Ins for People with Disabilities." Additional support was provided from a grant from 
the National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research of the U.S. Department of Education supporting the 
Rehabilitation Research and Training Center on Workforce Investment and Employment Policy for Persons with 
Disabilities and a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. 
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program design. In many states, persons with disabilities played a central 
role in planning the program and were heavily involved in surveys, field 
research, focus groups or other preliminary program design activities. 
Several states have formal mechanisms for involving persons with 
disabilities in program management.  
 
• The Medicaid Buy-In program is linked to other employment supports. 
To address the multiple barriers facing persons with significant disabilities, 
most states linked their Medicaid Buy-In program to complementary 
employment supports for persons with disabilities. Benefits counseling, 
expanded vocational rehabilitation services, supports for employers, and 
collaboration with One-Stop centers are among the programs in place.  
 
• The state Medicaid agency usually works with other state agencies to 
support persons with disabilities in the workplace. In general, states 
use existing Medicaid eligibility, reimbursement, service delivery and 
program management structures, both at the state and county level, to 
administer the Medicaid Buy-In program. In most states, the Medicaid 
agency has formal or informal relationship with other state agencies, 
particularly vocational rehabilitation programs, to carry out functions that are 
outside the scope of Medicaid. 
 
2. Eligibility standards and cost-sharing policies show considerable variation 
across the states and may have a significant impact on program 
enrollment.  
 
• Most Medicaid Buy-In programs have an upper income limit of 250% of 
Federal Poverty Level (FPL) and broadened asset standards, but vary 
considerably in how they "count" income and assets. With the 
exception of Connecticut and Minnesota, the upper income limit for 
Medicaid Buy-In programs is 250% of FPL ($1,790 monthly net income after 
applying the standard SSI disregards or $3,665 gross income for a single 
person in 2001). Connecticut's limit is 450% of poverty while Minnesota 
has no upper income limit. CoMost Medicaid Buy-In programs have an 
upper income limit of 250% of Federal Poverty Level (FPL) and broadened 
asset standards, but vary considerably in how they "count" income and 
assets. With the exception of Connecticut and Minnesota, and Oregon do 
not count the income of other household members, thus easing access to 
the program for certain married individuals. In every state except Alaska 
and Nebraska, applicants may retain more assets than persons in other 
Medicaid categories. In several states, retirement accounts, medical savings 
accounts, or approved employment accounts are not counted as assets and 
provide additional opportunities for individuals to save money. 
 
• Limits on unearned income may be an important factor in restraining 
enrollment in several states. In the states of Alaska, Maine, Nebraska, 
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and Vermont, in addition to gross income standards, applicants are subject 
to a separate dollar limit on their unearned income. This policy prevents 
enrollment of persons with significant income from non-work sources and 
may have the effect of reducing overall program enrollment.  
 
• Persons with incomes above specified levels must pay premiums. The 
threshold level for premium liability ranges from 100% FPL to 200% FPL. 
Four states--Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, and Vermont--use a premium 
schedule based on income brackets. In three others--Alaska, Connecticut, 
and Minnesota--applicants pay a premium calculated as a variable 
percentage of individual or household income. The states of Oregon and 
Wisconsin calculate premiums separately for earned and unearned income 
with steeper schedules for unearned income. This approach may 
discourage persons with substantial income from non-work sources from 
enrolling in the program. 
 
• Several states provide enrollment protections for individuals who lose 
employment while in the Medicaid Buy-In program, but protections are 
not consistent across the states. Such protections are designed to 
continue Medicaid eligibility for persons when they temporarily lose their ties 
to the workplace. Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin provide 
an incentive for continued work effort by providing Medicaid Buy-In program 
coverage during temporary periods of unemployment and, in Wisconsin, 
before an individual finds a job as well. Without such protections, individuals 
risk losing Medicaid benefits if a job effort fails. Allowing persons returning 
to other Medicaid categories to retain accumulated assets is an additional 
protection available in Connecticut and Minnesota. 
 
3. Available data are insufficient to show whether the program is meeting its 
objectives.  
 
• Before they began operating their Medicaid Buy-In programs, states 
developed enrollment and cost projections, often assuming 
considerable contributions from private insurance and premium 
payments. States typically used existing Medicaid eligibility and claims data 
to estimate program enrollment and per capita costs. States typically relied 
on the estimates of other states when projecting private insurance offsets 
and premium payment amounts. Thus far, premium payments and private 
insurance offsets have been lower than expected, due in part to lower than 
expected levels of earned income and insufficient work hours to qualify for 
private insurance coverage. States with large state-funded personal care or 
pharmacy programs, such as Connecticut and Wisconsin, are offsetting 
some previous state expenditures with federal Medicaid funds. 
 
• Program performance data are not available in a consistent format 
across the states. The amount and types of administrative program data 
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available from the states varies considerably. While every state can report 
the number of participants, the availability of data on earnings, private 
insurance coverage, or client characteristics is not uniformly available. Thus, 
it is not possible to compare state experience across a broad range of 
variables.  
 
• Preliminary data show actual enrollment exceeding projections in two 
states, falling short of projections in one state, and matching 
projections in five states. Minnesota and Iowa have exceeded 
projections, Nebraska has fallen short of projections, and Alaska, 
Connecticut, Maine, Vermont, and Wisconsin have matched projections. 
(Oregon did not provide information on projected enrollment.) Given the 
variation in state methods of projecting enrollment, it is not possible to 
identify with certainty the forecasting approaches that are most likely to 
result in accurate estimates. 
 
• Most Medicaid Buy-In program enrollees are persons who moved from 
another Medicaid eligibility category to the Medicaid Buy-In program. 
Consistent with state expectations, most Medicaid Buy-In program enrollees 
are individuals who were already enrolled in Medicaid and who moved from 
another category to the Medicaid Buy-In category. Such persons include 
both individuals who moved from a "spend-down" category to the Medicaid 
Buy-In program and persons who moved from another category when their 
incomes increased. 
 
4. State policies on general Medicaid eligibility, SSI, and state SSI 
supplementation and federal policies on SSDI affect Medicaid access for 
working persons with disabilities.  
 
• A state's choices about SSI and state SSI supplementation affect 
Medicaid access for working persons with disabilities. When states 
elect to provide automatic Medicaid eligibility for all SSI beneficiaries, SSI 
beneficiaries who go to work receive Medicaid coverage automatically 
through Section 1619 work incentives without submitting any additional 
documentation. Four study states--Iowa, Maine, Vermont, and Wisconsin 
--have automatic eligibility for federal SSI recipients. Five study states--
Alaska, Connecticut, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Oregon--make retaining 
coverage somewhat more difficult by requiring a separate application to the 
state for continued Medicaid coverage. Similarly, states can adopt policies 
that help assure continued Medicaid coverage when persons eligible only 
for state SSI supplements without federal SSI enter the work force. 
Connecticut, Vermont, and Wisconsin have adopted such policies. 
 
• A state's choices about income standards for persons with disabilities 
within its overall Medicaid program affect Medicaid access for working 
persons with disabilities. In a state with relatively generous Medicaid 
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income standards in non-Buy-In categories, a greater proportion of working 
persons with disabilities can gain access to Medicaid through avenues other 
than a Medicaid Buy-In program. Income standards in traditional Medicaid 
eligibility categories vary greatly across the study states with Alaska, 
Connecticut, Maine, Nebraska, and Vermont having higher income 
standards than the other states. 
 
• Several states cite the Social Security Administration's (SSA) inability 
to grant demonstration waivers for SSDI beneficiaries as a barrier to 
increasing program enrollment and the earnings levels of participants. 
Preliminary data suggest that significant numbers of persons participating in 
Medicaid Buy-In programs may increase their disposable incomes but are 
unwilling to earn more than $780 per month (Substantial Gainful Activity-
SGA) because their eligibility for SSDI will be jeopardized by doing so. (In 
states collecting earnings data, only 14% of enrollees in Medicaid Buy-In 
programs had earnings over SGA.) States want to implement projects that 
would move from the "cash cliff" to a gradual phase-out of benefits, but have 
not received authority to do so. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
For individuals with disabilities receiving Medicaid, the fear of losing health care 
and related services is one of the barriers keeping such individuals from maximizing 
their employment, earnings potential, and independence. Too often persons with 
significant disabilities can not obtain private sector health insurance that provides 
coverage of the services and supports that enable them to live independently and enter, 
remain in, or rejoin the workforce. Thus, they need to rely on Medicaid for coverage of 
such necessary services as personal assistance, prescription drugs, and durable 
medical equipment.  
 
Eliminating barriers to health care and other needed supports and creating 
financial incentives to work can greatly improve short and long-term financial 
independence and financial well being. So concluded Congress when it included a 
Medicaid Buy-In option in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and when it enacted the 
TWWIIA. By authorizing states to offer Medicaid Buy-In programs, these pieces of 
legislation opened a window of opportunity for states to develop work incentive 
initiatives that encourage people with disabilities to work or increase their level of work.  
 
To date, 19 states2 have implemented Medicaid Buy-In programs for working 
persons with disabilities, several additional states have enacted legislation aimed at 
creating such programs,3 and one state (Massachusetts) created a similar program 
under Section 1115 Demonstration Project authority. As states consider new policy 
initiatives, they need information from other states as to what has worked, what has not 
worked, and why. They need guidance on such issues as:  
 
• Who needs the services and supports?  
 
• How many people are likely to enroll?  
 
• How much will it cost?  
 
• What program design options are available?  
 
• What kind of infrastructure maximizes effective and efficient implementation?  
 
                                            
2 Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
3 States enacting legislation include Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, New York, 
Texas, and West Virginia. The legislation is diverse and in some states is directed toward the creation of 
demonstration projects. 
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• What are the best strategies for involving persons with disabilities in the decision-
making processes?  
 
• What standards are appropriate for measuring outcomes?  
 
To assist states as they seek answers to these questions, the Assistant Secretary 
for Planning and Evaluation, in coordination with the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, asked the Project Team to provide information on state experiences with the 
design and implementation of Medicaid Buy-In programs for workers with disabilities.  
 
The overall project had several purposes.  
 
• To examine and describe the early implementation experiences of nine states 
that opted for the Medicaid Buy-In program for working disabled persons.  
 
• To use the descriptive information to inform and provide technical assistance to 
various state-level stakeholders about the lessons that can be learned from these 
states.  
 
• To inform federal policymakers so that they can better understand the 
experiences of states implementing Medicaid Buy-In programs.  
 
To accomplish the project purposes, the Project Team prepared:  
 
• Case studies of each of nine states.  
 
• A summary of the lessons learned from the nine state Case Study.  
 
• A policy guide for developing health care and income assistance components of 
a state's comprehensive work incentive initiative for disabled workers.  
 
• A summary of conclusions and recommendations for use by federal agencies to 
enhance employment and earnings for persons with significant disabilities.  
 
The Case Study states are Alaska, Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin. These nine states, with approximately 
13,000 enrollees at the time of the study, are geographically dispersed and illustrate a 
variety of program design options and decision-making strategies.  
 
This paper describes the lessons learned from the nine state case studies. The 
paper examines information gathering strategies, Medicaid Buy-In program design 
features, policy approaches and administrative systems, cost estimation methodologies, 
and program experience. Eligibility standards for calendar year 2001 are used in the 
report.  
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II. POLICY APPROACHES AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE 
 
 
In each state, the specific roles played by stakeholder groups, such as state 
officials, consumers, advocates, providers and employers, in the design and 
implementation of the Medicaid Buy-In program vary. In general, states use existing 
state Medicaid administrative structures to manage their Medicaid Buy-In programs, but 
each state charted its own path in creating a program that met the needs of that specific 
state.  
 
In order to design their work incentives programs to meet the specific needs of 
their residents, states conducted surveys, held focus groups, carried out field research, 
and engaged in informal data gathering. They used these findings to refine their 
Medicaid Buy-In programs and to identify additional employment initiatives appropriate 
to support workers with disabilities.  
 
In all of the states, consumers with disabilities and their advocates, working with 
other stakeholders, play a central role in shaping the design of the Medicaid Buy-In 
program and related employment initiatives. Several states established formal 
mechanisms for involving consumers with disabilities and disability organizations. Other 
states provide less formal approaches for securing consumer input.  
 
 
A. Consumer Roles 
 
In most Case Study states, consumers participated in program design through 
cross-disability coalitions. For example, in Minnesota, the Minnesota Work Incentives 
Coalition and the Minnesota Consortium of Citizens with Disabilities played critical roles 
by conducting and publishing a survey on work incentives in the state. In Connecticut, 
a coalition established in 1999 consisting of disability groups, consumers, and 
advocates was a major force. Several consumer-focused groups continue to provide 
advice on the Medicaid Buy-In program, including the state Committee for Persons with 
Disabilities.  
 
In several states, a broad-based working group provided leadership for the 
creation of the Medicaid Buy-In program. In Oregon, for example, the state created a 
steering committee of advocates, consumers, researchers and state officials to design 
the original Medicaid Buy-In program. In Maine, the original Medicaid Buy-In Advisory 
Council included consumers, advocacy groups and service providers. This group was 
expanded and renamed CHOICES Advisory Group as part of the state's systems 
change work under the Medicaid Infrastructure grant.  
 
Wisconsin contracted with Employment Resources, Inc. and the University of 
Wisconsin to research work incentives. The project's Consumer Advisory Panel 
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included individuals with disabilities who had personal experience with the long-term 
support system and had faced barriers to getting and keeping work. In addition to 
surveys, the state asked a community rehabilitation provider to test innovative 
approaches to person-centered approaches, including Vocational Futures Planning.  
 
In Alaska, cross-disability groups, including the State Independent Living Council, 
the Governor's Committee on Employment and Rehabilitation of Persons with 
Disabilities, the Alaska Human Resources Investment Council and the Alaska Mental 
Health Trust Authority were involved in the initial planning of the Medicaid Buy-In 
program. The Governor of Alaska convened a Disability Summit where the high 
unemployment rate of persons with severe disabilities was discussed. In conjunction 
with consumer groups, Alaska conducted a survey and did field research to examine 
the efficacy of providing comprehensive vocational rehabilitation services and benefits 
counseling.  
 
In Iowa, an association of employers played a major role. The Iowa Business 
Council, consisting of the 25 largest businesses in the state, identified persons with 
disabilities as an untapped pool of potential employees. The Council worked with 
Creative Employment Options, the employment policy arm of a university-affiliated 
program, to create a Medicaid Buy-In Program to foster economic development in the 
state.  
 
States often use more informal approaches to gather information, including 
meetings with stakeholders and legislative and executive branch planning sessions. In 
Nebraska, the state convened a stakeholder group during the development of the 
Medicaid Buy-In program. In Vermont, several focus groups identified barriers faced by 
persons with disabilities and the need for benefits counseling. In Iowa, consumer 
groups are providing advice on an informal basis through the Personal Assistance and 
Comprehensive Family Support Services Council.  
 
 
B. The Role of State Legislatures 
 
State laws authorizing Medicaid Buy-In programs provided varying amounts of 
specificity about design issues. Laws in Iowa and Nebraska provide a general program 
framework with few design details. Laws in Alaska, Connecticut, Minnesota, Vermont 
and Wisconsin provide more detail on such design features as premium schedules, 
asset rules, and income standards. In these states, the executive branch was charged 
with operationalizing the design directives. In Maine and Oregon, the executive branch 
through Medicaid State Plan amendments without specific state legislation initiated 
Medicaid Buy-In programs. Subsequent legislative acts provided funding for the 
programs.  
 
In some states, prior to authorizing a Medicaid Buy-In program, the state 
legislature mandated studies, surveys, or demonstration projects to gauge the need for 
the program. In these states, Medicaid Buy-In programs and related employment 
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initiatives were established subsequent to the completion of the studies and surveys. In 
Connecticut, the Chair of the Human Services Committee in the House of 
Representatives established the Work Incentives Working Group that was instrumental 
in crafting the state's program. The Vermont legislature included language in an 
appropriations bill requiring a study of potential methods to increase the number of 
employed disabled individuals in the state. Subsequent legislation authorized the 
Medicaid Buy-In program.  
 
Similarly, the Wisconsin legislature, as part of an appropriations bill, created the 
Pathways to Independence Demonstration Project. The Pathways Project, established 
before the Medicaid Buy-In, was designed to provide coordinated vocational and health 
care advice to disabled individuals and provided a test of several elements of the state's 
system.  
 
 
C. Management Structures 
 
The Medicaid agency plays the lead role in most states on the development of 
policy and program implementation. In general, states use existing Medicaid 
management structures to administer the Medicaid Buy-In program. In some cases, 
program design features mirror those of other Medicaid-related programs.  
 
To address the multiple barriers facing persons with significant disabilities, many 
states developed additional work incentives to complement the Medicaid Buy-In 
program. Benefits counseling, expanded vocational rehabilitation services, and 
collaboration with One-Stop centers established under the Workforce Investment Act 
are among the incentives in place. Generally, the Medicaid agency has formal or 
informal relationships with other state agencies, particularly vocational rehabilitation 
programs and One-Stop service delivery systems.  
 
In Alaska, the Medicaid Buy-In program is part of "Alaska Works." Alaska Works is 
a cross-agency initiative spearheaded by the Governor's Council on Disabilities and 
Special Education which is designing and implementing reforms focusing on the role of 
One-Stop Centers, intake and referral procedures, and benefits counseling. The state 
Medicaid agency has worked extensively with the vocational rehabilitation program, 
One-Stop Centers and the State Workforce Investment Board.  
 
In Connecticut, the Medicaid Buy-In program is integrated into a broader 
Employment Plan that includes benefits counseling. The Rehabilitation Services Agency 
is heavily involved in benefits counseling where advice about the Medicaid Buy-In 
program is integrated into a broader Employment Plan developed for persons with 
disabilities. The Department of Social Services (which includes both the Medicaid 
agency and the agency administering the vocational rehabilitation program) conducts 
outreach.  
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In Iowa, the Department of Human Services (which includes the Medicaid 
program) established a "charter group" to help draft the regulations implementing the 
Medicaid Buy-In program, which included, among others, the vocational rehabilitation 
program and Disability Determination Services. In Maine, the Medicaid Buy-In program 
is running parallel to a Medicaid infrastructure enhancement project that is charged with 
improving coordination of a range of policies and organizations. The Bureau of 
Vocational Rehabilitation within the Department of Labor is a partner on the Medicaid 
Buy-In as is the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Substance 
Abuse Services.  
 
In Minnesota, the Department of Human Services assists county agencies in the 
implementation of the program. One-Stop Centers established under the Workforce 
Investment Act are involved in outreach and vocational rehabilitation training and 
counseling. In Nebraska, as part of its Medicaid Infrastructure grant, the state is 
seeking to integrate more effectively the operations and policies of the Medicaid Buy-In 
program with other services to support working persons with disabilities.  
 
In Oregon, the Department of Human Resources runs the Oregon Employment 
Initiative, the state's comprehensive work incentive initiative, as well as the Medicaid 
Buy-In program. Various divisions within the Department of Human Resources sit on the 
Initiative Steering Committee. Employment Initiative Specialists work with employers 
and provide, among other things, benefits counseling, peer mentoring, assistance in 
writing PASS and Impairment-Related Work Expenses (IRWE) plans, interview 
preparation, and self-advocacy skills for interacting with employers.  
 
In Vermont, the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation has lead responsibility for 
implementing the Vermont Work Incentives Initiative Project that includes benefits 
counseling, job training, and case management. The Division works closely with the 
Medicaid agency on the development of policy and implementation of the Medicaid Buy-
In component. Vermont's Medicaid Buy-In program design is modeled after and uses 
the same fees, premiums, collection efforts and sanctions as the state children's health 
insurance program.  
 
In Wisconsin, the Pathways to Independence program, the state's demonstration 
project providing comprehensive programs integrating health care, vocational 
rehabilitation, benefits counseling, and other services and supports, is run jointly by the 
Department of Workforce Development and the Office of Strategic Finance of the 
Department of Health and Family Services. The program is coordinated with the 
Medicaid Buy-In program.  
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III. MEDICAID BUY-IN PROGRAM 
DESIGN FEATURES 
 
 
Medicaid Buy-in program eligibility criteria, cost-sharing policies and other design 
features vary among the states. In seven of the states, 250% of the FPL is the upper 
income limit. Connecticut, adopted an upper level of 450% of FPL. Minnesota's 
program has no upper income limit due to the state's decision to disregard all income 
when determining program eligibility. While program eligibility is limited to persons with 
disabilities with earnings, some states provide options that extend eligibility to 
unemployed persons who will soon go to work or return from a work absence.  
 
 
A. General Eligibility 
 
Eight states require participants to be working to enroll in the Medicaid Buy-In 
program. In Wisconsin, an unemployed individual participating in a Health and 
Employment Counseling (HEC) program can be eligible for the Medicaid Buy-In. 
Participants in HEC develop an employment plan and can participate in the in the Buy-
In program for up to one year under their employment plan. Three states (Maine, 
Minnesota and Vermont) have a six-month eligibility period. The other states 
determine eligibility annually.  
 
While states are constrained by federal law from directly requiring that Buy-In 
participants work a minimum number of hours, several states specify certain work-
related requirements. Connecticut requires applicants to make contributions to FICA. 
Oregon specifies that an individual must have taxable income to participate. Minnesota 
requires income from work every 30 days to remain eligible for the Medicaid Buy-In 
program.  
 
Connecticut is the only state extending coverage to those who are "medically 
improved." To qualify under the Medically Improved Group, a person must have been 
previously eligible for the Medicaid Buy-In under basic coverage and must be 
determined during a regularly scheduled medical review to no longer meet the 
program’s disability requirements due to medical improvement. Persons qualifying as 
medically improved must work at least 40 hours a month.  
 
 
B. Income Eligibility 
 
As permitted under federal law, each state established its own unique set of 
income eligibility standards for their Medicaid Buy-In programs and developed related 
policies on the use of individual or household income, additional income disregards, and 
unearned income limits. As part of their eligibility standards, the states of Alaska, 
Maine, Nebraska, and Vermont impose separate limits on the amounts of unearned 
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income (e.g., SSDI) qualifying individuals can receive. These limits restrain enrollment 
by limiting participation to persons whose unearned income falls below a set level. See 
Table 1 for details on income eligibility.  
 
TABLE 1. Income Eligibility Criteria 
 Whose Income is Counted? 
What is the Countable 
Income Eligibility Limit? 
What Disregards Apply 
in Determining 
Countable Income? 
Is There a 
Separate Unearned 
Income Limit? 
Alaska Individual and 
spouse for total 
income. 
Individual for 
unearned income. 
Two part test:  
1. Family net income less 
than 250% FPL.  
2. Individual unearned 
income less than APA 
standard of need. 
Standard SSI disregards. Yes. Unearned income 
must be less than APA 
standard of need.  
Connecticut  Individual. 450% FPL 
$6,250/mo (gross) or 
$3,082/mo (net) after SSI 
disregards. 
Standard SSI disregards. No.  
Iowa Individual and 
spouse. 
250% FPL for family size. Standard SSI disregards. No.  
Maine Individual and 
spouse. 
Two part test:  
1. Countable unearned 
income less than 100% 
FPL.  
2. Earned and unearned 
combined less than 250% 
FPL. 
Standard SSI disregards, 
plus additional state 
disregard on unearned or 
earned income of $55. 
Yes. Unearned income 
limit is 100% FPL plus 
$75.  
Minnesota Individual. No income limit. 1902(r)(2) All earned and 
unearned income ignored. 
No.  
Nebraska Individual and 
spouse. 
Two part test:  
1. 250% FPL for family size 
using standard SSI 
disregards.  
2. Sum of all unearned and 
spouse’s earned income 
less than SSI benefit level 
for family size. 
Standard SSI disregards. 
Individual’s earned income 
disregarded in part 2 of 
eligibility test. 
Individual’s unearned 
income if from Trial Work 
Period. 
Yes. Unless an 
individual is in a Trial 
Work Period or 
Extended Period of 
Eligibility, SSDI income 
(minus disregards) 
must be less than SSI 
income standard.  
Oregon Individual. 250% FPL for individual. All unearned income, 
standard SSI disregards, 
and Employment and 
Independence Expenses. 
No.  
Vermont Individual and 
spouse. 
Two part test:  
1. Family net income less 
than 250% FPL.  
2. Family net income less 
earnings and $500 of 
SSDI at or below 
medically needy protected 
income level. 
Standard SSI disregards. 
Disregard all earnings and 
$500 of SSDI for part 2 of 
eligibility test. 
Yes. Unearned income 
limit is the medically 
needy program’s 
protected income level 
plus $500.  
Wisconsin Individual and 
spouse. 
250% net family. Standard SSI disregards. No.  
 
Upper Income Level 
 
Seven of the states included in the Case Study established an upper income 
eligibility limit at 250% of the FPL. Monthly income at 250% of poverty was 
approximately $1,790 net income after applying standard SSI income disregards or 
$3,665 gross income for a single individual ($43,980 annually) in 2001. Connecticut 
has opened its program to any individual with gross income of less than $6,250/month 
(equivalent to $75,000 annually) or net income of $3,082/month (approximately 450% 
FPL). Minnesota has no upper income limit. It has instead used its authority under 
Section 1902(r)(2) of the Social Security Act to disregard all income.  
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Individual or Household Income 
 
When determining eligibility, six states--Alaska, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, 
Vermont, and Wisconsin--count the income of both the medically eligible individual 
and his or her spouse (if any), while three, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Oregon, 
count only the income of the individual with a disability, regardless of household size.  
 
Unearned Income Limits 
 
In addition to total income criteria, the states of Alaska, Maine, Nebraska, and 
Vermont have established separate limits on unearned income. In Alaska, applicants 
must have individual unearned income less than the Alaska Public Assistance (APA) 
benefit standard. Maine restricts eligibility to individuals with unearned income less than 
100% FPL plus $75. In Nebraska, the sum of all unearned income and the spouse’s 
earned income must be less than the SSI benefit level for the appropriate family size but 
with an exemption from the limit if the individual has substantial earnings from a Trial 
Work Period or Extended Period of Eligibility. The unearned income limit in Vermont is 
the state's medically needy program's protected income level of $733 plus the $500 
unearned income disregard.  
 
Income Disregards 
 
All states use standard SSI disregards to determine net income for purposes of 
eligibility.4  Five states exclude additional types of income in determining eligibility. As 
noted earlier, Minnesota disregards all earned and unearned income in order to allow 
working persons with disabilities of any income level to qualify for entry into the 
program. In addition to the federal disregard of $20 per month, Maine has a separate 
$55 per month state disregard of unearned income when counting unearned income. 
Nebraska disregards the individual’s unearned income if it is gained during an SSDI 
Trial Work Period or Extended Period of Eligibility. Oregon disregards all unearned 
income in determining eligibility. Vermont disregards $500 of the applicant’s SSDI 
income in determining whether the individual meets unearned income requirements.  
 
 
C. Resource Limitations 
 
With the exception of Alaska, the Case Study states allow substantially higher 
levels of assets for Medicaid Buy-In program participants than are allowed for SSI 
beneficiaries. Moreover, several states encourage additional savings by disregarding 
assets held in retirement accounts, medical savings accounts, or other approved 
accounts created to pay employment or independence-related expenses. Several states 
provide considerable increases over previous levels, with Connecticut allowing 
                                            
4 Standard SSI disregards include the first $20 of any monthly income and the first $65 of monthly earned income 
plus one-half of the remaining earnings. IRWE and Blind Work Expenses are also disregarded when appropriate. 
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resources of $10,000 for an individual and $15,000 for a couple, Wisconsin providing 
for $15,000 for an individual (with no limit on spousal assets) and Minnesota setting a 
standard of $20,000 (and also putting no limits on spousal assets). See Table 2 for a 
complete list of asset standards.  
 
Several states encourage specific kinds of saving by excluding additional amounts 
of specified types of assets from the Medicaid Buy-In resource limit. Four states 
(Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, and Oregon) specifically exclude retirement accounts 
and medical savings accounts from the calculation of countable assets. Wisconsin 
excludes retirement accounts initiated after enrolling in the Buy-In. In Vermont, all 
assets purchased with earnings accumulated through work after January 1, 2000 are 
exempt.  
 
Five states created separate “approved accounts” for the purposes of paying 
employment or independence-related expenses. Iowa disregards funds in an assistive 
technology account in the calculation of assets. Wisconsin allows participants to 
register retirement and other savings accounts as Independence Accounts; up to 50% 
of earned income can be placed in an Independence Account. Oregon, Vermont and 
Connecticut also offer some form of approved accounts.  
 
TABLE 2. Resources Limits and Exclusions 
 What is the Resource Limit? 
Are Retirement Accounts 
Excluded from 
Countable Assets? 
Are Medical Savings 
Accounts Excluded from 
Countable Assets? 
Are Approved Accounts 
for Employment or 
Independence Excluded? 
Alaska $2,000 Individual 
$3,000 Couple 
No. No. No.  
Connecticut $10,000 Individual 
$15,000 Couple 
Yes. Yes. Yes.  
Iowa $12,000 Individual 
$13,000 Couple 
Yes. Yes. Yes, Assistive Technology 
Accounts.  
Maine $8,000 Individual 
$12,000 Couple 
No. No. No.  
Minnesota $20,000 (Only 
count individual 
assets) 
Yes. Yes. No.  
Nebraska $4,000 Individual 
$6,000 Couple 
No. No. No.  
Oregon $12,000 (Only 
count individual 
assets) 
Yes. Yes. Yes.  
Vermont $2,000 Individual 
$3,000 Couple 
Plus assets 
accumulated from 
earnings since 
1/1/00. 
Yes, if from earnings after 
1/1/00. 
Yes, if from earnings after 
1/1/00. 
Yes, if from earnings after 
1/1/00.  
Wisconsin $15,000 (Only 
count individual 
assets) 
Yes. Retirement accounts 
initiated after Buy-In 
enrollment are not 
counted.  
Retirement accounts 
existing prior to Buy-In 
enrollment are counted. 
No. Yes, Independence 
Accounts.  
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D. Cost-Sharing Policies 
 
In every state, enrollees with incomes exceeding specified levels--ranging between 
100% and 200% FPL--are assessed premiums. States differ as to whether they assess 
premiums based on family income or individual income and on whether they use net or 
gross income as the cost-sharing base. For purposes of cost-sharing, states may make 
different decisions about income disregards and treatment of household income than 
they made during the eligibility process. Their decisions reflect differing priorities about 
relative ease of entry to the program and equitable allocation of program costs. Some 
states have crafted their cost-sharing strategies to be similar to those in other Medicaid 
programs such as waiver programs or SCHIP. The approaches require varying amounts 
of administrative time and expertise.  
 
Every state has established a minimum income level at which eligible persons 
begin to share in program costs. The minimum level for payment of a premium ranges 
from 100% FPL (Minnesota [after December 2001] and Alaska) to 200% FPL 
(Connecticut and Nebraska). Iowa, Maine, and Wisconsin begin assessing premiums 
at 150% FPL and Vermont at 185% FPL. In Oregon, individuals pay a premium if they 
meet one of two conditions: either individual earned income is greater than 200% FPL 
or unearned income exceeds the SSI income standard plus state supplement. Table 3 
details the options states have chosen in setting premiums.  
 
Design decisions made in the eligibility phase, such as counting household 
income, income disregards, or the treatment of unearned income, may or may not be 
used in determining cost-sharing. For example, Iowa and Wisconsin use family income 
to determine eligibility, but individual income to determine premiums. Connecticut does 
just the opposite, using individual income to determine eligibility and family income to 
determine premiums.  
 
Some states have special provisions designed to reduce premium liability. 
Wisconsin collects a premium if individual gross income is above 150% FPL for the 
enrollee’s family size. That is, an eligible individual with a spouse would have his 
individual income applied against a two-person poverty level standard. Minnesota has 
a similar approach, collecting a premium only if an individual’s income exceeds 100% 
FPL for the appropriate family size. (Prior to December 1, 2001, premiums began at 
200% FPL.)  
 
Several programs reduce premiums if individuals are paying for private insurance 
or Medicare. In Vermont, individuals in the 225-250% FPL bracket are eligible for a 
discounted Medicaid Buy-In premium if they secure employer-sponsored coverage. In 
Connecticut, premiums paid for private insurance reduce an individual's liability for 
Buy-In premium payments. In Maine, a premium is due if net family income is above 
150% FPL; however, there is no premium at any income level if the individual with a 
disability is paying a Medicare Part B premium.  
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Alaska, Connecticut, Maine, and Oregon deduct IRWE to determine countable 
income for cost-sharing. Oregon also deducts “Employment and Independence 
expenses” and Wisconsin has a special deduction for medical and remedial expenses. 
Medicaid Buy-In programs in Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin 
have explicit links to employer-sponsored health insurance coverage. Those states 
require Medicaid payment for employer-sponsored coverage for which individuals are 
eligible if such coverage is less costly than Medicaid.  
 
Setting Premiums 
 
States use one of three methods to set premiums:  
 
− A percentage of all income,  
− A fixed amount based on income brackets, or  
− Separate payments schedules for earned and unearned income.  
 
Percentage of Income 
 
Alaska, Connecticut and Minnesota calculate premiums as a percentage of total 
income. Alaska charges a varying percentage based on income and family size up to a 
maximum of 10%. Initially, Minnesota charged 10% of individual income above 200% 
FPL for the family size. As of December 1, 2001, the premium is based on a sliding 
scale between 1-7.5% beginning at 100% FPL. Connecticut calculates 10% of family 
net income above 200% FPL, minus any income paid toward the cost of health 
insurance.  
 
Fixed Premium Based on Income Brackets 
 
Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, and Vermont assess a fixed dollar premium that varies 
according to income brackets. In Maine, for example, the premium is $10 per month if 
monthly income is 150-200% FPL or $20 per month if monthly income is 200-250% 
FPL. Nebraska uses a steeper premium schedule, with individuals paying $29 per 
month at 200% FPL and $175 per month at 249% FPL. In Vermont, the monthly 
premium, assessed only on persons whose incomes are at least 185% of poverty, is 
$10 up to 225% of poverty and $25 between 225% and 250% of poverty but is reduced 
to $12 if the individual secures employer-sponsored coverage. Iowa has eleven 
payment brackets, ranging from $20 to $207 monthly.  
 
Separate Payments for Earned and Unearned Income 
 
Oregon and Wisconsin calculate separate payment obligations for earned and 
unearned income with proportionately smaller premiums assessed on income derived 
from work. In Oregon, unearned income in excess of the SSI income standard ($533) is 
paid to the state. In addition, individuals pay a percentage of their earned income over 
200% FPL but with disregards for work and disability-related expenses. For persons 
liable for premiums, Wisconsin deducts the SSI income standard, IRWE, and medical 
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and remedial expenses, and then collects the remainder of the unearned income as part 
of the premium. The individual pays 3% of his earned income, in increments of $25, as 
a premium.  
 
TABLE 3. Cost-Sharing Policies: Minimum Income Level and Premium Method 
 
Income Level 
at Which 
Premiums Start 
Premium is a 
“Percent of Income” 
“Payment” based on 
“Income Brackets” 
Separate Premiums of 
“Earned” and 
“Unearned” Income 
Alaska 100% FPL net family 
income. 
Yes. Varying percent by 
income with 10% 
maximum. 
No. No.  
Connecticut 200% FPL net family 
income. 
Yes. 10% of family income 
minus any payments for 
private health insurance. 
No. No.  
Iowa 150% FPL gross 
individual income. 
No. Yes. Eleven brackets 
with monthly range from 
$20 to $207. 
No.  
Maine 150% FPL net family 
income; no premium if 
paying Medicare Part B. 
No. Yes. 
150<200% FPL=$10 
monthly. 
200<250% FPL=$20 
monthly. 
No.  
Minnesota Gross individual income 
of 100% FPL for family 
size. (Before 12/1/01, 
200% FPL for family 
size.) 
Yes. Scale 1-7.5% of 
income above 100% FPL. 
(Before 12/1/01, 10% of 
income above 200% FPL.) 
No. No.  
Nebraska 200% FPL net family 
income. 
No. Yes. Five income bands 
with premiums from 2% 
to 10%. 
No.  
Oregon Two part test:  
1. Individual unearned 
income above SSI 
level.  
2. Individual’s earned 
income above 200% 
FPL after work and 
disability related 
disregards. 
No. No. Yes. All unearned 
income in excess of SSI 
income standard. 
Between 2% and 10% of 
individual’s adjusted 
earned income and 
remaining unearned 
income.  
Vermont 185% FPL net family 
income 
No. Yes. 
185-225% FPL=$10 
225-250% FPL=$12 (if 
have private insurance) 
or $25 (if no private 
insurance)  
No.  
Wisconsin Gross individual income 
below 150% FPL for 
enrollee’s family size. 
No. No. Yes. 100% of unearned 
income minus standard 
living allowance, work 
expenses, and medical 
and remedial expenses. 
3% of individual earned 
income.  
 
 
E. Protections and Assurances 
 
In some states, individuals who must leave the work force temporarily are able to 
remain in the Medicaid Buy-In program temporarily. A few states allow individuals who 
have acquired assets to retain them if they transfer to another Medicaid eligibility 
category. See Table 4 for details.  
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Continued Eligibility During Unemployment 
 
In Connecticut, to protect persons who have temporary health problems or are 
involuntarily terminated, an individual can continue to meet the employment test for a 
period of up to one year from the date of employment loss. To do so, the individual must 
profess an intention to return to employment. If employment ends for medical or other 
reasons, the Iowa Buy-In program participant may remain eligible for up to six months 
after the month of job loss if he or she intends to return to work.  
 
Participants in Minnesota’s Medicaid Buy-In program are required to have income 
from work every 30 days, but special allowances are made for those who switch jobs. 
Also, as of December 1, 2001, recipients are allowed up to 4 months of medical leave--
approved by a physician--without losing eligibility.  
 
In Wisconsin, if a Medicaid Buy-In program participant has been in the program 
for at least six months and has a health setback that makes him unable to work, the 
work requirement may be exempted for up to 6 months. The individual may also 
participate in the Health and Counseling program for up to a year. However, individuals 
may only participate in the Health and Counseling program twice in a two-year period 
with at least six months between each period of participation.  
 
TABLE 4. Work-Related Policies and Protections 
 Work Requirements Protections for Temporary Loss of Employment 
Protections When Returning 
to Other Eligibility Categories 
Alaska Must have earned income. None. None.  
Connecticut  Must make FICA contributions. Can continue Buy-In for one year 
after losing employment. 
Assets in retirement, Medical 
Savings Accounts, and 
approved accounts not counted 
during the individual’s lifetime.  
Iowa Must have earned income. Yes. May remain eligible for 6 
months after work stoppage. 
None.  
Maine Must have earned income. None. None.  
Minnesota Some income from work every 30 
days. 
Previously, up to 2 months of medical 
leave and allowances for switching 
jobs. After 12/1/01, up to 4 months of 
leave. 
As of 12/1/01, up to $20,000 in 
assets protected for one year.  
Nebraska Must have earned income. None. None.  
Oregon Must have taxable income. None. None.  
Vermont Must have earned income. None. None.  
Wisconsin Must be working or enrolled in an 
employment counseling program. 
Can remain in employment 
counseling for up to 1 year. 
Can enroll in HEC (time limited and 
restricted to twice in 5-year period). 
Can waive work requirement for 6 
months due to a health setback. 
None.  
 
Exclusion of Assets 
 
In Connecticut, an individual's assets in retirement, medical savings, and 
designated accounts are excluded from consideration during his lifetime if he reapplies 
for Medicaid under another eligibility category. As of December 1, 2001, Minnesota 
allows up to $20,000 in assets to be protected for one year if a person moves from the 
Medicaid Buy-In program to another Medicaid eligibility category.  
 
 14
SSI Demonstrations 
 
Several states secured authority from the SSA to operate demonstrations involving 
specified SSI recipients participating in Medicaid Buy-In programs. Wisconsin received 
approval to count as income $1 out of every $4 earned by specified SSI recipients 
participating in Medicaid Buy-In programs (and the Pathways to Independence 
Program), rather than the standard $1 for $2 calculation. The waiver also allows SSI 
recipients to save up to 50% of their earnings in an approved account. Vermont has 
also received approval to conduct a demonstration for specified SSI recipients 
participating in Medicaid Buy-In programs.  
 
 
F. Design Changes 
 
Minnesota made significant changes to its Medicaid program in 2001. The state 
adopted a poverty level program and increased the protected income level for their 
medically needy program to 80% of FPL. By allowing individuals additional Medicaid 
eligibility options, these changes are likely to reduce enrollment in the Medicaid Buy-In 
program. Several states are considering changes to their Medicaid Buy-In program. 
Alaska is considering changes to resource levels and income disregards to encourage 
additional enrollment, while Iowa is considering a provision limiting eligibility to those 
disabled workers who pay FICA taxes.  
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IV. COST ESTIMATES AND 
BUDGET MODELING 
 
 
When preparing budget estimates, states relied primarily on existing state 
Medicaid data, especially eligibility and claims data for current and former Medicaid 
clients, and SSA data on SSI and SSDI recipients. Some states used surveys and 
studies from state vocational rehabilitation, state mental health or developmental 
disabilities agencies. States often considered the data sources available to them 
inadequate.  
 
Each of the eight states providing budget assumptions (Oregon did not provide 
assumptions) expected Medicaid Buy-In program enrollees generally would be existing 
Medicaid beneficiaries and estimated some offsets in program costs from premium 
payments. Connecticut and Wisconsin assumed cost offsets from converting 
individuals in state-funded pharmacy or home care programs to Medicaid. Some states 
estimated savings from private insurance coverage, while others did not attempt to 
quantity private insurance dollars. Alaska's cost estimates assumed all individuals 
enrolled in the Buy-In would leave public insurance coverage after a short period of 
time.  
 
Several states based their budget modeling on the enrollment and cost experience 
of other states. For example, Minnesota based its cost estimate on Massachusetts' 
experience implementing its Section 1115 waiver; Wisconsin based its cost estimate 
on the experiences of Oregon and Massachusetts; and Connecticut based its cost 
estimate on the experiences of states such as Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin.  
 
In preparing fiscal estimates for their Medicaid Buy-In programs, analysts 
developed models that estimated the number and characteristics of Buy-In Program 
enrollees. Major variables influencing estimates were:  
 
• Number of persons expected to enroll.  
 
• Proportion of enrollees transferring from another Medicaid category.  
 
• Proportion of enrollees transferring from a state-funded program.  
 
• Amount of premium dollars.  
 
• Proportion of enrollees with private insurance coverage.  
 
• Length of time each person would remain enrolled.  
 
Based on their analysis of the interactions among these variables, six of the nine 
states predicted relatively modest budget increases relative to the size of their Medicaid 
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program and two (Alaska and Wisconsin) predicted cost savings over time. As noted, 
Oregon did not report budget estimates or assumptions.  
 
Every state reporting information suggested that all or most potential enrollees 
would consist of existing Medicaid enrollees. Analysts in Connecticut likely conveyed 
the view of other Case Study states when they noted that "Medicaid is such an essential 
service that almost every disabled person would have been willing to forego earnings 
previously if that is what was necessary to meet the requirements for the Medicaid 
program." These individuals were predicted to result in no new net costs to the state 
because they were already on the Medicaid rolls.  
 
Connecticut and Wisconsin adjusted their cost estimates to account for new 
federal revenue to supplant state funds. Connecticut has a state-funded prescription 
program (ConnPACE) and a state-funded personal assistance program. When 
enrollees in those programs convert to Medicaid through Medicaid Buy-In program 
participation, federal revenues become available for their personal assistance and 
prescription drug costs. The state budget estimate included these new revenues. In 
Wisconsin, analysts assumed some persons enrolled in the state-funded Community 
Options program, a community-based long-term care program, would transfer to the 
federally matched Medicaid Buy-In program.  
 
Every state assumed some offsets from premium payments. Some states 
assumed large savings from increased private insurance coverage. In Minnesota, for 
example, the estimate assumed 16% of enrollees would gain employer-based coverage 
with estimated annual savings to the state of at least $3,500 per person depending on 
the individual's need for personal assistance services.  
 
The states of Alaska and Wisconsin assumed cost savings over time as a result 
of the Medicaid Buy-In program. The fiscal note in Alaska assumed net savings to the 
state after the third year based on working individuals leaving the SSI state supplement 
program and then leaving the Medicaid rolls for workplace coverage after a year of 
continued Medicaid coverage. The Wisconsin estimate assumed net savings over time 
as a result of a high level of premium payments combined with new federal funds for 
previously state-funded programs.  
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V. PROGRAM EXPERIENCE AND OUTCOMES 
 
 
As of the end of 2001, approximately 13,000 persons were enrolled in the 
Medicaid Buy-In program in the nine Case Study states. Consistent program data are 
not available across the states. In most of the states, enrollment data thus far show 
enrollment consistent with estimates. The percentage of persons previously enrolled in 
Medicaid programs is generally consistent with estimates.  
 
There is considerable variation in the percentage of enrollees paying premiums, 
with as few as 11% in Maine to 58% in Alaska. Most states are finding that significant 
numbers of persons on SSDI enrolled in the Medicaid Buy-In program (in the 86% 
range) are earning below the SGA level ($740 monthly in 2001). In general, both 
earnings levels and private insurance participation are lower than expected.  
 
 
A. Data Sources 
 
Medicaid Buy-In program data are often piecemeal and categorized by states as 
preliminary. Some of the data may not be reliable because the experience base is too 
short and the numbers are relatively small. Alaska, Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin 
are among the states analyzing data from their comprehensive work incentive initiatives. 
This analysis is ongoing and official findings have not yet been reported.  
 
Several states are using their Medicaid Infrastructure grant funds to strengthen 
data collection capacity, including the establishment of databases, the development of 
research designs, and the hiring of experts. For example, Alaska, Maine, and 
Nebraska are using their Medicaid Infrastructure grants to, among other things, develop 
and implement a research plan focusing on program features such as eligibility, 
enrollment, and costs. Connecticut is gathering data on enrollees through its Medicaid 
information system and expects to publish utilization and cost data for the Medicaid 
Buy-In program group after automated eligibility is instituted.  
 
 
B. Program Experience 
 
The categories used by states to report program experience and outcomes 
include:  
 
− Age  
− Persons paying premiums  
− Persons with private health insurance  
− Persons previously enrolled in Medicaid, including SSI and SSDI recipients  
− Earned income amounts  
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− Unearned income amounts  
− Persons earning over the SGA Level.  
 
Based on point-in-time reporting from all nine states, there were approximately 
13,000 enrollees in the Medicaid Buy-In programs as of the end of 2001. (For 
enrollment details for each state, see the individual case studies.) In most of the states, 
data thus far show enrollment consistent with estimates. However, the states of Iowa 
and Minnesota have enrolled substantially more persons than forecast, while 
Nebraska has enrolled fewer persons than expected.  
 
Previous Medicaid Enrollment 
 
The percentage of persons previously enrolled in Medicaid programs was relatively 
high and generally consistent with estimates. Examples of state reports are 88% in 
Maine, 75% in Minnesota, and 90% in Vermont. States incur higher costs when an 
individual transfers from the state's medically needy program with a spend-down to a 
Medicaid Buy-In program without a spend-down. Alaska reported that persons enrolled 
in the Medicaid Buy-In program incur lower monthly costs than they did when enrolled in 
other Medicaid eligibility categories.  
 
Private Health Insurance 
 
Data available from Alaska and Minnesota show 12% of Medicaid Buy-In 
program participants enrolled in private health insurance, a smaller number than 
predicted.  
 
Premium Payments 
 
The proportion of persons paying premiums or other cost-sharing varied 
significantly among the states. With six states reporting, the percentage of enrollees 
paying premiums was 58% in Alaska, 40% in Oregon, 30% in Iowa, 17% in 
Minnesota, 16% in Wisconsin, 15% in Connecticut, and 11% in Maine.  
 
Earned Income 
 
Significant numbers of persons on SSDI enrolled in the Medicaid Buy-In program 
are earning below the SGA level. With the states of Connecticut, Minnesota, 
Wisconsin, Iowa and Oregon reporting earnings data, approximately 14% of enrollees 
had monthly earnings exceeding the SGA test for disability under the SSDI program 
($740 in 2001). Nine percent of total enrollees had earnings over $1,000 a month.  
 
Oregon reported that 51% of its Medicaid Buy-In program participants had 
earnings over the SGA level. As described in the Oregon Case Study, Oregon requires 
participants to pay as a cost-share any unearned income in excess of the state's SSI 
standard. Thus, persons who choose the Medicaid Buy-In program in Oregon must 
have sufficient earnings to compensate for the unearned income premium.  
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Unearned Income 
 
Connecticut, Iowa and Minnesota provided information on unearned income. 
Monthly unearned income exceeded $600 in nearly two-thirds of the cases.  
 
TABLE 5. Monthly Unearned Income of Medicaid Buy-In Enrollees 
 None $1-$600 $600-$799 $800-$999 $1,000 & more 
Reported by 
Connecticut, 
Minnesota and 
Iowa  
7.9% 26.5% 37.4% 18.7% 9.3% 
 
Age 
 
Wisconsin, Oregon and Minnesota provided information on the ages of 
participants. In each of the three states, at least two-thirds of the Medicaid Buy-In 
program enrollees were aged 40 or older. Based on these data, Medicaid Buy-In 
program participants are substantially older than participants in SSI work incentive 
programs. Two-thirds of Section 1619 recipients nationally are under the age of 40.  
 
 
 
 20
VI. EFFECT OF THE MEDICAID BUY-IN ON 
ACCESS TO COVERAGE 
 
 
Based on their design decisions, three of the nine Case Study states--Iowa, 
Connecticut, and Minnesota--have minimal restrictions on enrollment in their Medicaid 
Buy-In program. These states do not distinguish between earned and unearned income 
at the time of eligibility nor treat earned and unearned income differently when 
assessing premiums.  
 
Vermont, Alaska and Maine impose upper limits on unearned income for 
qualifying persons, thus restraining enrollment of persons with significant income from 
sources other than work. Oregon and Wisconsin use separate premium schedules for 
earned and unearned income that assess higher premiums on unearned income than 
on earned income. These provisions have the effect of encouraging participation from 
persons with significant earnings from work and discouraging participation from those 
with small amounts of work earnings.  
 
Nebraska links the level of earnings to the amount of unearned income counted 
towards eligibility. In order to disregard any of his unearned income, an individual in 
Nebraska must have sufficient income from work to trigger a Trial Work Period (at least 
$560 monthly as of January 2002). Without that level of earnings, individuals in 
Nebraska must have unearned incomes at or below the SSI level to qualify for the 
program.  
 
 
A. Variation in Access to Medicaid 
 
Demand for and enrollment in the Medicaid Buy-In program are likely to be 
affected by how easily workers with disabilities can gain access to Medicaid through 
other eligibility categories. Medicaid eligibility standards provide a different eligibility 
baseline in each state. The effect of the variation in Medicaid eligibility standards is that 
each state had a different "maximum income level" through which persons with 
disabilities, including workers with disabilities, could gain access to Medicaid prior to the 
Medicaid Buy-In program. The highest income standard in each state's Medicaid 
program prior to the Medicaid Buy-In program is shown in Table 6.5 
                                            
5 Variation can occur in each of the following programs: (1) The income standard for the combined SSI and state 
SSI supplement. This standard governs Medicaid eligibility determination for persons receiving cash benefits 
through SSI and/or state SSI supplementation. (2) The "poverty level" or "standard of need" Medicaid 
eligibility category. If a state chooses a poverty level option, this standard governs Medicaid eligibility for persons 
who do not receive cash benefits from SSI and/or state SSI supplementation. (3) The amount of the protected 
income level under the "medically needy" Medicaid eligibility category. In states without a poverty level 
category, the protected income level determines how much money an individual not on SSI has to "spend-down" 
before qualifying for Medicaid. In states with a poverty level category, it provides an alternative eligibility 
mechanism for persons whose incomes exceed the poverty level standard. 
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TABLE 6. Medicaid “Starting Points” 
Year 2001 
 Starting Point Source 
Alaska $984 Standard of need  
Connecticut  $748 State SSI supplementation  
Iowa $531 Federal SSI standard  
Maine $791 Poverty level with disregards  
Minnesota $716 Poverty level  
Nebraska $716 Poverty level  
Oregon $533 State SSI supplementation  
Vermont $733 Medically needy protected income level  
Wisconsin $615 State SSI supplementation  
 
In Connecticut, Maine, Alaska and Nebraska, the Case Study states with the 
most expansive coverage, the highest Medicaid eligibility standard was at or above the 
FPL. In these four states, individuals with disabilities could qualify for Medicaid if their 
total incomes fell below a specified dollar figure. In Vermont, the highest Medicaid 
standard was a medically needy protected income level that is above the FPL. After July 
1, 2001, Minnesota established a poverty level Medicaid eligibility standard.  
 
As shown on Table 6, the highest Medicaid eligibility standard in Wisconsin was a 
state SSI supplementation level between the federal SSI standard and the FPL. Iowa 
and Oregon, the two states with the least expansive coverage, had no Medicaid 
eligibility standard above the federal SSI standard. In these two states, individuals with 
disabilities who were not on SSI could qualify for Medicaid only if they "spent down" to a 
level below the SSI level.  
 
Thus, the new eligibility rules created by the Medicaid Buy-In program have a 
greater or lesser effect on overall eligibility standards depending on the state's baseline 
or "starting point." In a state with relatively generous Medicaid income standards in non-
Buy-In categories, a greater proportion of working persons with disabilities can gain 
access to Medicaid through avenues other than a Buy-In program. Alaska, 
Connecticut, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Vermont have relatively generous 
non-Buy-In eligibility standards for persons with disabilities, Wisconsin has less 
generous standards, and Iowa and Oregon have the most restrictive standards.  
 
 
B. Access to SSI Work Incentives 
 
Medicaid Buy-In program enrollment may be influenced by the access of persons 
with disabilities to existing SSI work incentives. The ease with which SSI beneficiaries 
and persons receiving SSI state supplements can access Medicaid through SSI work 
incentives is another factor where there is great variation among states. If gaining 
access to continued Medicaid coverage is relatively easy for SSI beneficiaries who are 
working, such persons are more likely to secure continued Medicaid coverage through 
SSI work incentive provisions than if access is more difficult.  
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As shown on Table 7, ease of access to Medicaid for SSI beneficiaries--and thus 
access to continued coverage when beneficiaries goes to work--varies across the 
states. Four of the states--Wisconsin, Vermont, Maine, and Iowa--provide automatic 
Medicaid eligibility for federal SSI beneficiaries and thus automatic eligibility for 
continued Medicaid for SSI workers under the provisions of Section 1619(b). Three 
states--Alaska, Nebraska and Oregon--employ a more complex process by using 
federal SSI criteria for Medicaid eligibility but requiring a separate Medicaid application. 
The remaining two states--Connecticut and Minnesota--separate the two eligibility 
processes even more by using state-specific criteria for Medicaid eligibility.  
 
When federal SSI beneficiaries have earnings that affect their eligibility for cash 
benefits, they automatically maintain Medicaid benefits in the states of Iowa, Maine, 
Vermont, and Wisconsin. Federal SSI officials send the names of eligible persons to 
the state and the beneficiary is not required to complete any additional forms. In the 
remaining five states, state Medicaid agencies are responsible for using federal data to 
secure continued eligibility for SSI beneficiaries who go to work. The administrative 
processes involved are often challenging for states to carry out and for Medicaid 
beneficiaries to understand.  
 
Access to SSI work incentives for persons who receive a state SSI supplement but 
no SSI cash benefits is often even more complex. Only one of the eight states with a 
state SSI supplement--Vermont--has chosen federal administration of the benefit. In 
Vermont, recipients of state SSI supplements receive the same Medicaid coverage 
protection as SSI beneficiaries due to federal administration of the state SSI 
supplement. In the other seven states with state SSI supplementation programs, SSI 
recipients must apply for the state supplement and Medicaid at the state level. Of the 
seven states, only Connecticut and Wisconsin grant continued Medicaid coverage to 
state supplement-only recipients who lose their state SSI supplement due to earnings.  
 
TABLE 7. Administration of Medicaid Eligibility Criteria and State SSI Supplementation 
State 
Automatic 
Medicaid for 
Federal SSI 
Recipient 
Federal SSI Criteria, 
but Separate Medicaid 
Application Required 
State Criteria for 
Medicaid (209(b) 
option) Separate 
Medicaid Application 
Required 
Federally 
Administered 
State SSI 
Supplement 
State 
Administered 
State SSI 
Supplement 
Alaska  X   X 
Connecticut    X  X 
Iowa X     
Maine X    X 
Minnesota   X  X 
Nebraska  X   X 
Oregon  X   X 
Vermont X   X  
Wisconsin X    X 
 
 
C. Federal Barriers Affecting State Initiatives 
 
Minnesota, Vermont and Wisconsin have submitted to the SSA requests for 
demonstration authority for specified SSDI recipients participating in the Medicaid Buy-
In program. (Connecticut has authority under its state law to seek similar 
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demonstration authority). In general, the demonstration authority would permit the 
states to "stop the clock" for specified participants regarding the Trial Work Period and 
the Extended Period of Eligibility, cessation month, grace months, and other related 
timelines. Additionally, the states wish to disregard some earned income to prevent 
precipitous declines in SSDI payments, such as reducing SSDI payments by $1 for 
every $2 above the SGA level. These states perceive the failure of the SSA to grant 
demonstration authority as adversely affecting their ability to enroll people in the 
program and increase earnings of enrollees above SGA. Additional barriers include the 
component of the definition of "disability" used for SSI and SSDI that includes the 
inability of an individual to engage in work (Wisconsin and Nebraska).  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and the TWWIIA authorized states to enact 
Medicaid Buy-In programs for disabled workers. These laws provided state 
policymakers and other stakeholders an opportunity to focus on issues associated with 
employment of persons with significant disabilities. As these case studies in nine states 
illustrate, the experiences of states that have implemented Medicaid Buy-In programs 
and related employment initiatives provide a wealth of information for other states.  
 
At the same time, a state should recognize the limitations of the experience of 
other states. Every state starts from a different baseline as it relates to Medicaid 
eligibility rules, the relationship between SSI eligibility and Medicaid, SSI state 
supplementation, and the implementation of existing SSI work incentives. The purpose, 
function, and size of a state's Medicaid Buy-In program vary depending on its policies 
governing eligibility for cash benefits, work incentives, and health coverage through 
Medicaid. Thus, the design of a Medicaid Buy-In program must be viewed in the context 
of a state's overall Medicaid program, other state-specific initiatives, and fiscal 
considerations.  
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